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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
This is an action seeking to have the statute authorizing
annexation of appellant's property to Centerville City declared
unconstitutional.
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted respondent Robert B. Hansen's
Motion to Dismiss

and held that Section 10-2-401, Utah Code

l1i111otcitcd 1953, as enacted by the Laws of Utah 1977, is
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's
order and a determination by this court that the statute
authorizing annexation of

~ppellant's

property to CenterviU

City is unconstitutional.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case are not in dispute.

Appell

agrees that Centerville City has proceeded in accordance wU
Section 10-2-401, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as recodified
in 19 77, to

anne:~

his property into the city thereby subject

his property to taxation by Centerville City.

The

constit~

tionality of said statute is the sole issue involved in
this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 10-2-401, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, AS ENACTED BY THE LAWS OF UTAH
1977, IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
The appellant claims that Section 10-2-401, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 48, Section 2,
of the Laws of Utah 1977, deprives him of his property with·
out due process of law by not requiring notice to and an
election of the landowners involved in annexation proceeili~
Said Section 10-2-401, which is very similar to its repeal~
predecessor Section 10-3-1, provides as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Whenever a majority of the owners of
real property and the owners of at
least one third in value of the real
property, as shown by the last assessment rolls, in territory lying contiguous
to the corporate boundaries of any
municipality, shall desire to annex
such territory to such municipality,
they shall cause an accurate plat or
map of such territory to be made
under the supervision of the municipal
engineer or a competent surveyor, and
a copy of such plat or map, certified
by the engineer or surveyor as the
case may be, shall be filed in the
office of the recorder of the municipality, together with a written petition
signed by a majority of the real
property owners and by the owners of
not less than one third in value of
the real property, as shown by the last
assessment roles, of the territory
described in the plat or map; and the
governing body of the municipality, at
a regular meeting shall vote on the
question of such annexation. The members of the governing body may by
resolution passed by a two-thirds vote,
accept the petition for annexation,
subject to the terms and conditions
as they deem reasonable, and the territory shall then and there be annexed
and within the boundaries of the municipality.
If the territory is annexed
a copy of the duly certified plat or
map shall at once be filed in the
office of the county recorder, together
with a certified copy of the resolution
declaring the annexation. The articles
of incorporation of the municipality
shall be amended to show the new
territory annexed to the municipality
and a copy of the articles of amendment
shall be filed with the secretary of
state and county clerk or clerks in
the same manner as prescribed in 10-2-108.
On filing the maps, plats and articles
of amendment, the annexation shall be
deemed complete and the territory annexed
shall be deemed and held to be part of
the annexing municipality, and the inhabitants
thereof shall enjoy the privileges of the
annexation and be subject to the ordinances,
resolutions and regulations of the annexing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Except for the inclusion of the additional requirement
pertaining to one-third of the value of the real property
in 1957, the foregoing statute has provided for the
initiation of annexation proceedings by a written petition
of a majority of the real'property owners since 1898.
A general statement of law applicable to the
legislative powers pertaining to annexation is set forth in
56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, §55, with numerous
supporting cases, as follows:
In the absence of constitutional
limitations, it is generally considered
that the power of a state legislature
over the boundaries of the municipalities
and counties of the state is absolute and
that the legislature has power to extend
the boundaries of a municipal corporation,
or to authorize an extension of its
boundaries, without the consent of the
inhabitants of the territory annexed, or
the municipality to which it is annexed,
or even against their express protest.
To the same effect is Dillon on Municipal Corporations,
(5th Edition), §355, page 617.
A more specific statement of the constitutionali~
of annexation statutes which do not provide for the consent
of, and notice to, the inhabitants of annexed areas thereunder is contained in 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations

It is well settled that the legislature m~
not only originally fix the boundaries or
limits of a municipal corporation, but, subject
to constitutional restriction, may subsequentli
annex, or authorize the annexation of, conti~
or other territory without the consent or even
against the remonstrance of persons residing
therein.
Annexation of land by the legisla~
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withuut assent of or notice to the inhabitants
is not a denial of due process. And it
follows that notice by publication does not
violate the due process requireraents of the
federal and state constitutions.
Indeed,
the state f",ay authorize the extensIODOf the
territorial area of a municipal corporation with
or without the consent of the citizens or even
against their protest, unrestrained by ani
provision of the Federal Constitution.
Dut while the legislature has the power to provide for, or authorize, the annexation of
territory without the consent of the inhabitants
residing therein, it may, and usually does,
provide for such consent as a condition of
annexation.
Inasmuch as the legislature may
provide for the annexation of territory to
municipal corporations without the consent of
the inhabitants of the annexed territory,
the inhabitants cannot complain of any
limitations upon their ability to express their
disapproval if the legislature sees fit to
make the statute conditional upon its
acceptance by the affected territory. Thus,
if the annexation of a small municipal corporation to a large one is made conditional
upon its acceptance by a majority of the
voters of the two municipal corporations
taken together, the citizens of the smaller
one cannot complain although their vote is
overpowered by that of the larger one; nor
is it any ground for objection that the right
to vote upon the acceptance of the act is
limited to the taxpaying electiors of the
territory which it is sought to annex, or,
still less, that it is left to those possessing
the suffrage at general elections, so that
owners of taxable property in the annexed
district having no right to vote, such as
nonresidents and corporations, have no voice
in the matter. And a statute permitting
contiguous territory to be brought into a
municipality on the vote of the majority of
the electors within the municipality only
is constitutional.
(Emphasis added).
A leading case in support of the foregoing authorities is Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 52 L. Ed. 151,
28 S. Ct.

40, which involved a Pennsylvania statute permitting

the cunsoljddtion
of a smaller city with a larger city upon
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the approval of a majority of the votes cast in both citi~
at an election called for that purpose, even though a maj~
of the votes in one of the cities opposed it, as occurred
in the consolidation of the cities of Pittsburgh and All~~
The United States Supreme Court, in sustaining the constit~
tionality of the statute, capsulized the holdings of many
cited cases as follows:
***It would be unnecessary and unprofitable to analyze these decisions or quote
frora the opinions rendered. We think the
following principles have been established
by them and have become settled doctrines
of this court, to be acted upon wherever
they are applicable. Municipal corporations
are political subdivisions of the state,
created as convenient agencies for exercisi~
such of the governmental powers of the state
as may be intrusted to them.
For the purpose
of executing these powers properly and
efficiently they usually are given the
power to acquire, hold and manage personal
and real property.
The number, nature, and
duration of the powers conferree upon these
corporations and the territory over which
they shall be exercised rests in the absolute
discretion of the state. Neither their
charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them property
to be used for governmental purposes, or
authorizing them to hold or manage such
property, or exempting them from taxation
upon it, constitutes a contract with the
state within the meaning of the Federal
Constitution. The state, therefore, at its
pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such
property, hold it itself, or vest it in
other agencies, expand or contract the
territorial area, unite the whole or a
part of it with another municipalityr repeal
the charter and destroy the corporat1on.
All this may be done, conditionally or
unconditionally, with or wit~out the.consent
of the citizens, or even against the1r
protest.
In all these respects the state
is supreme, and its legislative body
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conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will unrestrajned by
any provision of the Constitutjon of the
United States. Although the inhabitanti
and property owners ma~ by such changes,
suffer inconvenience, and their pro ert
may be lessened in value by t e burden of
increased taxation, or for any other reason,
they have no right, by contract or otherwise, in the unaltered or continued existence
of the corporation or its powers, and there
is nothing in the Federal Constitution which
protects them from these inJurious consequences.
The power is in the state, and those who
legislate for the state are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive exercise of it.
Applying these principles to the case
at bar, it follcws irresistibly that this
assignment of error (permitting the voters
of the larger city to overpower the voters
of the smaller city) , so far as it relates
to the citizens who are plaintiffs in error,
must be overruled."
(Emphasis added).
For a case supporting Hunter v. Pittsburgh and setting forth
several cases in Iowa which have

consiste~tly

held that

failure to provide for any notice and hearing on the question
of annexation of territory to a municipality does not deprive
owners of their property without due process of law, see
City of Cedar Rapids v. Cox, 250 Iowa 457, 93 N.W. 2d 216,
appeal dismissed 359 u.S. 498, 3 L.Ed. 2d 976, 79 S. Ct. 1118,
in which the Supreme Court of Iowa concluded:
If, as we have held, extension of municipal
boundaries without assent of or any notice
to the inhabitants is not a denial of due
process, certainly annexation upon publjshed
notice does not have that result.
In one of the Iowa cases cited in the ~case, Wertz v.
Ottumwa, 201 Iowa 947, 208 N.W. 511, it was held that a general statute authorizjng the council of a city or town by
resolution to incorporate into the city or town any adjoining
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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platted territory did not deprive the mmers of the added
territory of their property without due process of law,
stating their conclusion thusly:
We think that a failure to provide for a
notice and h~aring on the question of
annexation does not render the statute
unconstitutional.
The legislature had power
to provide by law how municipalities shall
be incorporated, and also how their boundari~
may be extended. The legislature did not
'
transcend constitutional limitations by the
statute in question, in failing to provide
that the question of annexation of territory
to an existing municipality must be submitted
to a vote of the people interested therein.
In the absence of constitutional limitations
to the contrary, the legislature may by
statute provide for the extensic~ of the
boundaries of a municipality without the
assent of the inhabitants of either the
municipality or the territory to be annexed.
(Citing cases.)
The statute is not unconstitutional
because no notice of the proposed annexation
was given to appellants and because the
question of anne:cation was not subrni tted
to a vote of the electors of the annexed
territory.
In Lenox Land Co. v. Oakdale, 137 Ky. 484, 125 S.W. 1089,
on rehearing 127 S. W. 538, writ of error dismissed 231 U.S.
739, 58 L.Ed. 461, 34 S. Ct. 317, it was held that a statute
which provided for the extension of municipal boundaries by
an ordinance of the city council did not violate the const~
tutional provision against taking property without due

pro~

of law, or without just compensation, although the notice
required by the statute was insufficient to warn persons
whose property was annexed.

The Court of Appeals of Kentud

stated as follows:
If the constitutional provision protect~~
property owners from being deprived of their
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Proper~y without due process of law, or fron
having their property taken without just
compensation, applied to the annexation of
territory, the position of counsel for
appellants would be well taken.
But it has
been repeatedly announced, by this court
and others, that the question of due process
of law or the taking of property without
compensation has no application to the annexation
of territory to a municipality.
The extension
or reduction of the boundaries of a city or
town is held, without exception, to be purely
a political matter, entirely within the power
of the legislature of the state to regulate.
The established doctrine is that the state
legislature has the unlimited right to pass
such laws for the annexation of territory
to municipal corporations as in its judgment
will best accomplish the desired end, and
that a different method may be provided for
each class.
It may, if it chooses, direct
that notice shall be given personally to
each individual owner of property sought
to be annexed, or that notice by publication
shall be given, or that notice by posting copies
of the ordinance at any place shall be sufficient,
or it may provide that no notice at all need be
given.
In short, the manner of annexation is
entirely beyond the power of the courts to
control if the provisions of the statute are
followed.
(Citing cases.)

In City of Tucson v. Garrett, 77 Ariz 73, 267 P. 2d 717, 719,
the Supreme Court of Arizona held as follows under an annexation
statute substantially similar to that of Utah providing that
on presentation of a petition signed by the owners of not
less than one-half in value of property in any contiguous
territory, the city may by ordinance annex such territory
upon filing with the county recorder copies of the ordinance
with an accurate map of the territory annexed:
In analyzing this statute, an enunciation
of some of the well-established rules applicable to the addition of territory to municipalities, and the legislative power in connection
-9-
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therewith, is apl-'ropriate.
The extent of
the right of municipalities to enlarge their
boundaries is dependent entirely on the
legislature and its power in that respect is
plenary in the absence of constitutional
limitations, and there are none affecting
t~e problem.h~rei~ .. The legislature may
give to mun1c1pal1tJes the power to annex
territory upon any condition it chooses to
impose, either with or without the wishes
of the inhabitanls of the territory involved
either with or without notice to anyone,
'
with or without the right of objecting
inhabitants to protest.***
(Emphasis added) .
The law in the State of Utah is in accord with
the foregoing authorities.

In the exhaustive and well-

reasoned case of Kimball v. City of Grantsville, 19 U. 368,
57 P. 1, the question presented for determination was
whether the legislative acts establishing the boundaries
of the city and authorizing municipal taxation thereof weu
vi0lative of state and federal constitutional provisions in
that such statutory enactments authorized taxation, for ci~
purposes, of lands lying outside the platted and improved
portion of the city, and used only for agricultural purposa
After reviewing many cases and authorities the court, in
unanimously holding that it is th~ legislature's prerogat~
not that of the judiciary--to provide for municipal
boundaries and the taxation thereof for municipal purposes,
quotes from Chief Justice Marshall in the landmark case of
McCulloch v. Maryland and then follows at page 5 of the
Pacific Reporter:
***In Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 562,
the same cmi nent jurist observes:
"The
power of legislation, and consequently of
taxation, operates on all the persons and
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property belonging to the body poljtjc. This
is an original principle, which has its
foundation in society itself. It is granted
by all for the benefit of all.
It resides
in thP government as part of itself, and need
no~ b~ reserved where property of any descr1 pt1on, or the right to use it in any
manner, is granted to individuals or corporate bodies. However absolute the right
of an individual may be, it is still in the
nature of that right that it must bear a portion
of the public burdens; and that protion must
be determined by the legislature. This
vital power may be abused, but the interest,
wisdom and justice of the representative
body, and its relations with its constituents,
furnish the only security against unjust and
excessive taxation, as well as against unwise
legislation." Accepting this as sound doctrine,
as we safely may, would not the judicial
department itself be guilty of transcending
its constitutional power were it to inquire
into the expediency, wisdom, or justice of
the legislation in question in this case?
Would not this department likewise transcend
its power if it would undertake to inquire
into the conditions and facts on which the
legislature acted in creating the municipality
of Grantsville City, fixing the boundaries,
and providing for the raising of revenue to
maintain the municipal government and defray
its expenses, and then substitute our judgment as to the sufficiency of such conditions
and facts to warrant the legislation, which
has resulted in the imposition of the tax
complained of, for that of the legislature?
Yet this is substantially what we are asked
to do. This, in itself, would be an abuse,
because it would be a usurpation of power
by one department of the government which
the people absolutely vested in another.
In further elucidating upon the exclusive province of the
legislature in matters of municipal expansion and taxation,
the Utah Supreme Court quoted with approval from other cases
on matters particularly apropos to the present inquiry:
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In Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78, whe
the limits of a city were extended so as ton
include agricultural land, Mr. Justice Mille
delivering the opinion of the court, said: r,
"It is not denied that the legislature could
rightfully enlarge the boundary of the city
of Pittsburgh so as to include the land. If
this power were denied, we are unable to s~
how such denial could be sustained. h'hat
portion of a state shall be within the limib
of a city, and be governed by its authoriti~
and its laws, has always been considered to
be a proper subject of legislation.
How
thickly or how sparsely the territory within
a city must be settled is one of the matters
within legislative discretion. Whether territ
shall be governed for local purposes for a
county, a city, or a township organization,
is one of the most usual and ordinary subject!
state legislation." And, again, he said:
"It may be true that he does not receive t~
same amount of benefit from some or any of
these taxes as do citizens living in the heart
of the city.
It probably is true, from the
evidence found in this record, that his tax
bears a very unjust relation to the benefits
received as conpared with its amount. But
who can adjust with precise accuracy the
amount which each individual in an organized
civil coIT.munity shall contribute to sustain
it, or can insure in this respect absolute
equality of burdens, and fairness in their
distribution among those who must bear the~
We cannot say judicially that Kelly receiv~
no benefit from the city organization." ***
So, in Washburn v. City of Oshkosh, 60 Wis.
453, 19 N.W. 364, Mr. Chief Justice Cole said:
"It may be unwise, even unjust, to include
within the limits of a city or village lands
used for agricultural purposes, and inpose
upon them the additional burdens of such
municipalities.
But where is the remedy?
Certainly not in the courts. Confessedly,,
the legislature has power, under the constitution, to provide for the organization of .
cities and incorporated villages, which carne
with it the power to fix the territorial boo~
aries of such public corporations.
If the
legislature sees fit to include agricultural
lands within its boundaries, what right have
the courts to control or review that legislat1 ve discret1on? Can the courts say to the
legislature it must not annex this territoi;r
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or that to the municipality; that it has not
ample power to prescribe the extent of the
city or village limits? It seems to us a
veFY plain proposition that such matters
rest entirely within the discretion and
under the control of the legislature."
(Emphasis added.)
After recognizing that Article XIII, Section 5, of the
Utah Constitution expressly prohibits the legislature from
imposing a tax for municipal purposes on property within any
city but authorizes it to empower local government to do
so, and that under Section 10 of that same Article XIII all
property, real and personal, located "within the territorial
limits of the authority levying the tax," is subject to
taxation for municipal or other reasons, the court concluded:
***When, therefore, as in the case at bar,
a city has been incorporated, and a local
government established, such government is
an "authority" to levy a tax. There is no
limitation as to the extent of the "territorial
limits" of a municipality or taxing district,
and therefore, as we have noticed, the fixing
of the boundaries of a cit or taxing district,
and amount of area it shall contain, is w o y
a matter of legislative discretion, and the
exercise of such discretion is not a subject
of judicial investigation or revision.
(Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that the court specifically
overruled the prior cases of Kaysville City v. Ellison, 18
U. 163, 55 P. 386, and People v. Daniels, 6 U. 282, 22 P.
159, the latter being a territorial case decided before
statehood and the adoption of the state constitution in
which the court held that the territorial legislature's
extension of municipal boundaries may constitute the taking
0f privat~ property for public use, contrary to the Fifth
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

Amendment to the United States Constitution, if the exten.
Slr

is unreasonable and embraces territory used only for agricu]
tural or horticultural purposes.

co~

In this respect, the

in the Kimball case speci..fically held that ArU cle I, Secti•
22, of the Utah Constitution--"Private property shall

not~

taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.".
is not a limitation on the taxing power of the state but
is a limitation on the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
It is thus apparent that the appellant's
of statutes of sister states, as well as our own

citati~

territor~

laws, only sustains the posi ti.on of the respondents herein,

namely that annexation and the imposition of municipal tum
upon annexed properties is solely a matter of legislative
determination which may provide for notice to, and consent
of, the inhabitants of the annexed area, the annexing

ci~,

or both, but may also authorize such extension without
notice to or consent of the inhabitants and even against
their express protest, all without contravening state or
federal due process requirements.

The provisions of the

Utah law on municipal annexation fall in the middle area
of the foregoing spectrum by requiring the initiation of
annexation proceedings, not by the municipality, but by t~
written petition of a majority of the affected landowners
representing at least one-third of the assessed value of
the area seeking annexation.

The fact that the legislature

of some states have chosen different procedures for municip
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annexations than others is no basis for declaring the law

of one or the other of those states unconstitutional.

The

legislative enactments of the State of Utah stand on their
own n1erit, not on the collective judgment of another state's
lawrr.akers.
In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that
Section 10-2-401, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted in
1977, is constitutionally valid and the order of dismissal
of the appellant's complaint by the lower court should be
affirmed.
POINT II
THE EXTENSION OF MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES
AND THE IMPOSITION OF MUNICIPJl.L TAXES
UPON ANNEXED PROPERTY IS A LEGISLATIVE
MATTER.
The respondent incorporates herein the argument
as set forth under POINT I.

The Utah legislative enactment

under attack by the appellant has not been shown to be
violative of either the federal or state constitutions and,
therefore, should be upheld.

CONCLUSION
Although one is

in~ressed

with the research and

energy that has gone into the appellant's efforts to guard
against that which he envisions as a threat to his concepts
of justice and individualistic well-being, it js most
app~r0nt

that his resourcefullness and honest endeavor have

nr_)t_ supplant-ed his need of col'lpetent legal assistance.
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As much as we may agree with appellant's reproach of
diet~~

increasing governmental paternalism as a prelude to

ship and slavery at the hands of those who should be servinr
as watchmen on the towers of

~estern

ei~

civilization, the

year-old statutory procedure for annexation in Utah hardly
seems to be the focal point of such an insurrection.

Jud~

intervention into the legislative arena for determining
such matters would be far more violative of the principles
of government enunciated by our founding fathers.

The order

of the lower court should be affirmed and by so doing,
Centerville City will be enriched by the inclusion of a
true son df liberty in her electorate.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General of the Statecl
JACK L. CRELLHJ,
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant/R9~
Robert B. Hansen, Attorney Ge
of the State of Utah
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